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The Presumption of Judicial Review 
International Trade Disputes 
by The Honorable Edward D. Re* 
. In 
"Judicial Oversight-Relations Between the Court and the Agencies" is the 
theme of the Third Annual Judicial Conference of the United Sta:tes Court of 
International Trade. As this year's theme indicates, the Conference will examine 
the interrelationship between the court and those agencies primarily responsible 
for regulating import transactions under the nation's international trade laws. 
The speakers will focus on the effect of the court's decisions on the policies and 
procedures of the Customs Service, the International Trade Administration of 
the Department of Commerce, and the International Trade Commission. More-
over, they will provide us with their own unique perspective as to the many 
important issues that the court and agencies face daily. 
In this context I shall discuss briefly the role of the Court of International 
Trade as it applies the presumption of judicial review in this important field of 
law. 
The court and its predecessor tribunals have a long relationship with the 
various international trade agencies, dating back almost two hundred years, to 
the earliest days of our nation. The present court is the result of a continuous 
empiric legislative process. This process culminated with the Customs Courts 
Act of 1980, I which not only expanded the jurisdiction and powers of the Court 
of International Trade. but also reaffirmed and perfected its status as an Article 
III court. That legislation made clear that the Court of International Trade is 
a constituent part of the mainstream of the federal judicial system, with all the 
powers in law and equity possessed by, or conferred by statute upon, a federal 
district court. 2 
The result of this evolutionary process is the present United States Court of 
International Trade. Unlike other federal courts, this court does not usually 
resolve disputes between private parties. It is a national court that constantly 
and daily reviews a wide variety of administrative actions by those agencies 
charged with the administration of our nation's international trade laws. 
• Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade. 
I Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417. 94 Stat. 1727 (l980)(codified as amended in 
scattered sections of titles 19 and 28 of the United States Code). 
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1585 (1982). 
173 
174 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. X, No, 2 
In the area of customs and trade disputes, the federal judicial system, through 
the institution and the procedures of the Court of International Trade, was 
intended by Congress to provide protection to those parties who maintained 
that they were aggrieved by ultra vires or wrongful government actions. Domestic 
manufacturers, importers, and others who believe that they have been treated 
illegally or unjustly by officials of our trade agencies can seek judicial review of 
the government's activities by bringing a lawsuit in the Court of International 
Trade. 3 It is well to remember the legislative mandate of the 1980 Act-namely, 
to provide persons adversely affected or aggrieved by agency actions arising 
out of import transactions with the same judicial review and judicial remedies 
available to persons aggrieved by other agency actions. 4 This statutory enact-
ment brought the field of international trade law closer to the ideal of equal 
justice under law. 
The legislative history of the 1980 Act explicitly provides that 
the expertise and national jurisdiction of the Court of International 
Trade ... [and its appellate court] be exclusively utilized in the 
resolution of conflicts and disputes arising out of the tariff and 
international trade laws, thereby eliminating the present jurisdic-
tional conflicts between these courts and the federal district and 
appellate courts.5 
This clear and unambiguous statement of purpose defines and shapes the court's 
relationship with those agencies which administer and enforce the customs and 
international trade laws of the United States. Equally important, it forms the 
basis for the presumption of judicial review in international trade disputes. 
Much of the court'os work involves the application of traditional principles of 
administrative law. In its broadest terms, administrative law is the law that 
governs the machinery of government.6 It determines the manner in which 
agencies may exercise the powers delegated to them.7 It further provides courts 
with the remedial devices which make judicial review of administrative actions 
meaningful. 
For many years, litigants before this court could be certain that the court 
would apply well-established principles of administrative law that pertain to 
judicial review. Specifically, the court would review the discretionary action of 
an administrative official, unless there was a clear showing that Congress in-
3 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2631 (1982)(provides standing for actions in the Court of International 
Trade). 
4126 CONG. REC. H9342 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 1980)(statement of Rep. Rodino). 
5 H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-28 (1980). 
6 See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.1, at 2 (2d ed. 1978). 
7Id. 
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tended to preclude judicial review.s Of course, even if review was available, in 
cases of express delegation of discretion and authority, the standard of review 
would be limited to whether the administrative decision was arbitrary or con-
trary to law, and therefore an abuse ofdiscretion. 9 Hence, it seemed clear that 
judicial review should be presumed, and that the preclusion from judicial review 
is the rare exception. 
The principle of the presumption of judicial review was clearly set forth in 
the case of Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner. 10 There, the Supreme Court stated that 
the Administrative Procedure Act "embodies the basic presumption of judicial 
review to one 'suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute,' 
... so long as no statute precludes such relief or the action is not one committed 
by law to agency discretion .... "11 In this seminal case, the Court emphasized 
that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing' evidence of a contrary 
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review."12 
In 1971, the Supreme Court had occasion to explain the extent of this 
presumption of reviewability in the equally important case of Citizens to Preserve 
Overton Park v. Volpe. 13 In Overton Park, the Supreme Court declared that the 
"committed to agency discretion" exception is "very narrow," and that the 
exception is applicable only "in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn 
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."'14 
The policies and reasoning which underlie these seminal cases of administra-
tive law have long provided guidance and precedent to this court and its 
predecessor, the Customs Court. An example is the Suwannee Steamship case,15 
in which the Customs Court applied the principles enunciated in the Supreme 
Court cases of Abbott Laboratories and Overton Park. 
Indeed, in the Suwannee case, the court recognized the dispute as to the 
availability of judicial review of discretionary agency action. In view of these 
and other precedents, it stated with certainty that "the suggestion that ... 
agencies have untrammeled authority to act in areas committed to agency 
discretion reftect[s] a position that has been increasingly restricted, if not nul-
lified, in recent years as the courts have taken a fresh look at the judicial review 
provisions of the APA." The court, therefore, held that discretionary action was 
8 See 5 U.S.c. § 702 (1982). 
9 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). 
10 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
II [d. at 140. 
"/d. at 141. 
13 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
14 [d. at 410 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945». 
IS Suwannee Steamship Co. v. United States, 70 Cust. Ct. 327, C.R.D. 73-3, 354 F. Supp. 1361 
(1973). 
176 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. X, No.2 
reviewable, and denied the government's motion to dismiss. 16 In the second 
Suwannee case, the court reviewed the merits of the challenge to agency action. 
It held that the administrative action was not an abuse of discretion, and 
therefore upheld the actionY 
It is submitted that the advantage of the Suwannee approach is that, in per-
mitting judicial review of the administrative action, the challenged action was 
subjected to an impartial and searching scrutiny. This scrutiny is beneficial in 
itself because it raises high the banner of government accountability, and induces 
careful and reasoned administrative decision making. Moreover, a searching 
judicial analysis reflects a concern for fairness, together with the necessity to 
adhere to the perceived intent and purpose of the law in question. Surely, this 
should be regarded as one aspect of our ideal of a government of laws. It would 
seem clear that judicial review can be, and usually is, an effective curb upon 
arbitrary administrative action. The evenhanded administration of justice re-
quires an impartial examination of the actions of governmental agencies and 
officials. 
The court must now consider the newly developing norms and precedents in 
the important field of judicial review of administrative action. Reference was 
made to the Suwannee cases, decided by the Customs Court, because Suwannee 
raised the important question of the availability of judicial review in cases in 
which a party felt aggrieved by an administrative agency or official. In making 
available judicial review to challenge an alleged abuse of discretion, the Suwannee 
cases brought international trade law into the mainstream of administrative law. 
It made available judicial review by applying the strong presumption of judicial 
review of administrative actions. 
Often, it has been assumed that administrative action included administrative 
inaction. It was taken for granted that, in the language of § 706 of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, the reviewing court could "compel agency action un-
lawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed."18 
However, under the recent case Heckler v. ChaneyI9 a court might distinguish 
between a party aggrieved by administrative action and a party aggrieved by 
administrative inaction. Hence, the court should not be surprised to receive a 
brief asserting that under Heckler v. Chaney the presumption of reviewability 
that prevailed under prior cases ought to be reconsidered. 
In the Chaney case, eight prisoners who had been convicted of capital offenses 
and sentenced to death by lethal injection petitioned the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA), asking that the FDA investigate the safety and effectiveness 
16 354 F. Supp. at 1368. 
17 Suwannee Steamship Co. v. United States, 79 Cust. Ct. 19, C.D. 4708, 435 F. Supp. 389 (1977). 
18 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1982); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1982). 
19 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
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of the drugs. The FDA declined to take action on the petition. Subsequently, 
the prisoners filed suit, seeking to compel the FDA to investigate and regulate 
the use of the drugs. The district court held that the decision of the FDA to 
refrain from regulation was not subject to judicial review. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated 
and remanded the decision. 20 The court held that the FDA's refusal to exercise 
its statutory authority was reviewable, and that the refusal was impermissible as 
being arbitrary, capricious, and without the authority of law. 
Judge Scalia, now Justice Scalia, dissented and identified a general presump-
tion of unreviewability. He dissented because of what he termed "a clear intru-
sion upon powers that belong to Congress, the Executive Branch, and the 
states."21 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and reversed. In an opinion delivered 
by Justice Rehnquist, the Court focused on the interplay between § 701(a) and 
§ 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. As we know, the reconciliation of 
these two sections has long prompted judicial and scholarly debate. The Su-
preme Court posed the question: "How is it ... that an action committed to 
agency discretion can be unreviewable and yet courts still can review agency 
actions for abuse of discretion?"22 
The Supreme Court sought to answer these questions by distinguishing the 
case of Overton Park. The Court noted that Overton Park involved an affirmative 
act of approval under a statute that set clear guidelines for determining when 
approval should be given. The Supreme Court in the Chaney case stated that 
"the Court of Appeals broke with tradition, case law, and sound reasoning" 
when it applied the "'no law to apply' standard of Overton Park" to an agency's 
decision not to undertake certain enforcement actions. 23 
The Court identified three main reasons why decisions to refuse enforcement 
are unsuitable for judicial review. First, the agency decision not to enforce 
"involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly 
within its expertise."24 Second, if an agency has acted, the action provides a 
focus for judicial review, and the court can "determine whether the agency 
exceeded its statutory powers."25 Third, the Court analogized the refusal to 
enforce with prosecutorial discretion. 26 
The Court then looked at the relevant provision of the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) and concluded that "the presumption that agency 
20 Chaney v. Heckler. 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
21 Id. at 1192. 
22 470 U.S. at 829. 
23 /d. at 83 J. 
24 /d. 
25 [d. at 832. 
26/d. at 834. 
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decisions not to institute proceedings are unreviewable under § 701 (a)(2) of the 
APA is not overcome by the enforcement provisions of the FDCA."27 The 
Supreme Court asserted that the District of Columbia Circuit "broke with tra-
dition" when it applied a presumption of reviewability. 
It is clear that the case is significant and will affect the relationship between 
courts and federal agencies. Even limited to its specific facts, it manifests a 
different approach to judicial review of administrative inaction. Clearly, Chaney 
presents an approach that both lawyers and judges must seriously consider. 
It is important to note that Customs enforces regulatory statutes and rules 
that pertain to imported merchandise on behalf of forty-eight other federal 
agencies. In light of Chaney, countless questions may be raised. For example, 
will challenges to a refusal by Customs to act on a request to exclude gray 
market goods be actionable in this court? In the past, importers who were the 
subject of a fraud investigation have brought suit for declaratory judgment 
regarding their culpability under § 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930. While this 
court has not specifically addressed the issue raised by these reverse § 592 
actions, the question under the Chaney decision may be whether the court may 
ever reach the merits. Or, in antidumping and countervailing duties actions, 
may Chaney be applicable in connection with the refusal of the ITA or the ITC 
to make confidential business information available under § 777(c)(2) of the 
Tariff Act of 1930? 
It is interesting to note that, in one case, the court was constrained to note 
the existence of the Chaney case, even though the parties did not mention the 
case in their briefs. In that case, referred to as the "slave labor" case,28 the 
plaintiffs had petitioned the United States Customs Service to bar importation 
of goods produced by forced labor. The Customs Service denied the petition. 
As the parties did not raise the issue, the court was not required to address 
"whether the denial of the petition is committed to agency discretion ... and 
therefore precluded from judicial review [under Heckler v. Chaney]."29 
As you have seen, the court has, in the main, embraced the traditional 
doctrines of reviewability of agency actions. During its nascent years, the Court 
of International Trade sought to define the limits and boundaries of its newly 
authorized jurisdiction and powers. 30 The court commenced by applying time-
27 [d. at 837. 
28 McKinney v. United States, 614 F. Supp. 1226 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985), afI'd, 799 F.2d 1544 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986). 
29 614 F. Supp. at 1241. 
30 See, e.g., Royal Business Machines, Inc. v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1007 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1980); 
Smith-Corona Group Consumer Products Division v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 10 15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 
1980). 
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honored concepts of administrative law, such as ripeness,31 timeliness,32 primary 
jurisdiction,33 exhaustion,34 and finality.35 Additionally, the court has engrafted 
the broad principles of equity onto the field of international trade law.36 In 
neither instance has the court sought to establish its own distinct norms of 
administrative law or equity jurisprudence. To the contrary, the court has 
adhered to the congressional directive that it look to and apply already existing 
judicial principles as developed by the other Article III courtsY 
Recent case law evidences a cross-fertilization of legal principles with the 
district courts and the courts of appeals beginning to benefit and borrow from 
the decisions of the Court of International Trade. For example, this has arisen 
in the context of the question of the timeliness of ajudicial challenge by a party 
aggrieved by a final agency order. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Federal 
Commerce Commission,38 the FCC adopted a final order which was released to the 
public and was later published in the Federal Register. An action was filed with 
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after release of the 
order, but prior to its entry, i.e., publication. The issue before the court was 
whether the action was commenced prematurely. The petitioner claimed that 
the statute in question, 28 U.S.C. § 2344, created a sixty-day "window" for the 
filing of a petition for review, rather than a filing deadline. 39 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the 
petition as premature, rejecting the petitioner's novel interpretation of the 
statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.c. § 2344. Circuit Judge Scalia, citing, 
inter alia, the British Steel decision of this court, stated that the "courts have often 
dismissed premature petitions under provisions analogous to § 2344, never 
suggesting that they were free to do otherwise."40 
This cross-fertilization also is found in the area of discovery and the question 
of the invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege. One court, for example, 
relying upon the Republic Steel case,41 rejected a claim of executive privilege, 
31 Special Commodity Group on Non-Rubber Footwear from Brazil v. Baldridge, 575 F. Supp. 1288 
(Ct. Infl Trade 1983). 
32 Tyler v. Donovan, 535 F. Supp. 691 (Ct. Infl Trade 1982). 
33 Lowa, Ltd. v. United States, 561 F. Supp. 441 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), afI'd, 724 F.2d 121 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984). 
34 Id.; Carlingswitch, Inc. v. United States, 560 F. Supp. 46 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983). 
35 Haarman & Reimer Corp. v. United States, 511 F. Supp. 814 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981). 
36 American Air Parcel Forwarding Co. v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 47 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981). 
37 See, e.g., 28 V.S.C. § 2643(c)(I) (1982); H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 61 (1980). 
38 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
39 !d. at 377. 
40 !d. at 378. 
41 Companie Francaise D'assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., I Fed. 
R. Servo 3d 167 (1984). 
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holding that whether the documents sought "would involve confidential inter-
ministerial deliberations" was not a sufficient basis on which to make a deter-
mination as to whether the documents withheld were akin to state secrets.42 
Courts also have relied on Court of International Trade decisions in the areas 
of administrative rules for stare decisis,43 and tests for when an agency official 
must comply with the notice-and-comment and publication requirements pre-
scribed by the Administrative Procedure Act. 44 
In this brief presentation, I have sought to indicate the emergence of a new 
development in the law and the possibility of its application to customs and 
international trade law. The Chaney case is only illustrative. Undoubtedly, there 
are many others. In addition, I have attempted to highlight the recent trend in 
the district courts and the courts of appeals utilizing decisions of this court as 
precedents. With the emergence of the Court of International Trade as an 
important constituent member of the federal judiciary, this process of cross-
fertilization will continue to playa prominent role in the development of federal 
jurisprudence. 
42/d. at 175. 
43 Cf Butterton v. Texas General Land Office, 789 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1986)(citing Toyota Motor 
Sales, U.S.A. Inc. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 649, 662 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), a/i'd, 753 F.2d 1061 
(Fed. Cir. 1985)) (agency practice, once established, is not frozen in perpetuity). 
44 Cf Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, No. 84-1988, slipop. (9th Cir. Mar. 30,1987) (citing Mast Industries, 
Inc. V. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984))(operating instructions must operate only 
prospectively and must not establish a binding norm to fall under procedural exception). 
